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It is commonly believed that equity ﬁnance for banks is more costly than deposits.
This suggests that banks should economize on the use of equity and regulatory con-
straints on capital should be binding. Empirical evidence suggests that in fact this
is not the case. Banks in many countries hold capital well in excess of regulatory
minimums and do not change their holdings in response to regulatory changes. We
present a simple model of bank moral hazard that is consistent with this observation.
In perfectly competitive markets, banks can ﬁnd it optimal to use costly capital rather
than the interest rate on the loan to guarantee monitoring because it allows higher
borrower surplus.
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A common justiﬁcation for capital regulation for banks is the reduction of bank moral hazard.
If banks hold a low level of capital, there is an incentive for them to take on excessive risk.
Given the widely accepted view that equity capital is more costly for banks than other forms
of funds, the common result in many analyses of bank regulation is that capital adequacy
standards are binding as banks attempt to economize on the use of this costly input.
In practice, however, it appears that banks often hold levels of capital well above those
required by regulation and that capital holdings have varied substantially over time in a way
that is di!cult to explain as a function of regulatory changes. For example, Berger et al.
(1995) report that the ratios of equity to assets of US banks fell from around 40-50 percent
in the 1840’s and 1850’s to 6-8 percent in the 1940’s, where they stayed until the 1980’s.
Comparing actual capital holdings to regulatory requirements, Flannery and Rangan (2007)
suggest that banks’ capital ratios have increased substantially in the last decade, with banks
in the US now holding capital that is 75% in excess of the regulatory minimum. Similar
cross-country evidence is provided in Barth et al. (2005) (see Figure 3.8, p. 119).1 In
search of an explanation of the capital buildup in the US throughout the 1980’s, Ashcraft
(2001) ﬁnds little evidence that changes in banks’ capital structure are related to changes in
regulatory requirements. Barrios and Blanco (2003) argue that Spanish banks’ capital ratios
over the period 1985-1991 were primarily driven by the pressure of market forces rather
than regulatory constraints. Also, Alfon et al. (2004) report that UK banks increased their
capital ratios in the last decade despite a reduction in their individual capital requirements,
a n do p e r a t en o ww i t ha na v e r a g ec a p i t a lb u er of 35-40 percent. Finally, Gropp and Heider
(2007) do not detect a ﬁrst order eect of regulation on banks’ capital holdings.
In this paper we develop a model of bank capital consistent with the observation that
banks hold high levels of capital which may change independently of regulation. Our model
is based on two standard assumptions. First, banks’ capital structures may have implications
for their ability to attract borrowers. Second, banks perform a special role as monitors. With
1A recent study by Citigroup Global Markets (2005) ﬁnds that “... most European banks have and
generate excess capital,” with Tier 1 ratios signiﬁcantly above target.
1these two features, we show that market forces can lead banks to hold levels of capital well
above regulatory minimums even when capital is relatively costly.
In our one-period model of bank lending, ﬁrms need external ﬁnancing to make productive
investments. Banks grant loans to ﬁrms and monitor them, which helps improve ﬁrms’
performance. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the more monitoring eort a bank exerts, the
greater is the probability that a ﬁrm’s investment is successful. Given that monitoring is
costly and banks have limited liability, banks are subject to a moral hazard problem in the
choice of monitoring eort and need to be provided with incentives. One way of doing this
is through the amount of equity capital a bank has. Capital forces banks to internalize
the costs of their default, thus ameliorating the limited liability problem banks face due to
their extensive reliance on deposit-based ﬁnancing. A second instrument to improve banks’
incentives is embodied in the interest rate on the loan. A marginal increase in the loan
rate gives banks a greater incentive to monitor in order to receive the higher payo if the
project succeeds and the loan is repaid. Thus, capital and loan rates are alternative ways to
improve banks’ monitoring incentives, but entail dierent costs. Holding capital implies a
d i r e c tp r i v a t ec o s tf o rt h eb a n k s ,w h e r e a si n c r e a s i n gt h el o a nr a t eh a san e g a t i v ei m p a c to n l y
for borrowers in terms of a lower proﬁt from the investment. Which incentive instrument (or
combination of instruments) is used in equilibrium will depend on how surplus is allocated
between banks and borrowers.
We consider two distinct cases. In the ﬁrst, we assume that the bank operates in a mo-
nopolistic loan market. The second case we consider is where there is a perfectly competitive
loan market so that borrowers’ surplus is maximized.
We start with the benchmark where there is no deposit insurance. In this case if the
bank’s projects are unsuccessful the bank defaults and depositors do not receive anything.
In order for depositors to be willing to provide their funds to the bank they require a premium
in non-default states. The higher the probability of default the higher this premium needs
to be. This mechanism provides an additional incentive for banks to monitor since by doing
so they can lower their cost of funds. In the case of monopoly, since the bank obtains
all the surplus, it will exert the maximum monitoring eo r ta sl o n ga si n t e r m e d i a t i o ni s
proﬁtable. When project returns are high the loan rate provides all necessary incentives.
2When project returns are lower, capital also becomes necessary. The market allocation is
constrained e!cient in the sense that a regulator attempting to maximize social welfare by
imposing capital controls cannot improve on it.
With perfectly competitive markets where borrowers obtain the surplus and there is no
deposit insurance the results are quite dierent. Here competitive market pressures ensure
that banks will use more capital than in the monopoly solution. The reason is that, to ensure
maximal monitoring, borrowers are better o with a lower loan rate and higher capital. The
lower loan rate directly beneﬁts borrowers while the higher level of capital aects them only
indirectly through the bank’s participation constraint. As a result the market solution is
often ine!cient because the market only cares about maximizing borrower surplus. Here, a
regulator can improve social welfare by imposing regulations to lower the amount of capital
banks use.
T h ec a s ew h e r et h e r ei sd e p o s i ti n s u r a n c ei sm o r ec o m p l e xt oa n a l y z e . T h ep r e s e n c e
of deposit insurance implies that the degree of monitoring does not aect a bank’s cost of
deposits. Thus deposit insurance blunts banks’ incentives to monitor and as a result banks’
portfolios are more risky. This potentially provides a role for capital regulation. By requiring
banks to hold a minimum amount of capital it is possible to provide incentives to monitor and
reduce ﬁrm risk. Indeed this is one classic argument for having capital regulation - to oset
the incentive problems created by deposit insurance. In the case of monopoly we show that
there is some merit to this argument. For low values of project returns and low costs of equity
capital a regulator can improve social welfare compared to the market solution by requiring
banks to hold more capital than they would voluntarily do. However, for other regions of
the parameter space the allocation is constrained e!cient. In the case with competition and
deposit insurance the market again usually provides incentives to use too much capital. For
large parts of the parameter space the problem, as in the no deposit insurance case, is that
banks use too much capital. For a relatively small part of the parameter space banks use
too little capital. For the remainder the market is constrained e!cient. Thus the results in
this case are similar to those with no deposit insurance. However, the “excess capital” is
less likely to occur than without deposit insurance as deposit insurance blunts monitoring
incentives, thus increasing the scope for capital regulation.
3Our paper is consistent with the observation that banks hold capital that is well in excess
of capital requirements as we observe in practice. It is also consistent with the fact that
changes in capital regulation do not aect banks’ capital structures as found by Ashcraft
(2001), Barrios and Blanco (2003) and Alfon et al. (2004). These ﬁndings suggest that
market discipline can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has been stressed in the
literature on the use of subordinated debt (for a review, see Flannery and Nikolova, 2004),
but also from the asset side of banks’ balance sheets.
Our model also provides some interesting insights into the role of deposit insurance. A
standard rationale for deposit insurance is that it helps prevent bank runs as in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and coordination failures among depositors which may prevent the creation
of banks as in Matutes and Vives (1996). Our model provides another rationale. Although
in most situations deposit insurance lowers social welfare, we show that in some cases it can
improve the allocation of resources by reducing the use of costly capital. Without deposit
insurance, limited liability implies that banks must pay a high rate of interest to compensate
for losses when they default. In order to assure depositors that default will not occur banks
use capital when expected project returns are low. This eect is not present when there
is monopoly with deposit insurance so banks use no capital. This reduction in the use of
capital can lead to an improvement in social welfare if the cost of capital is su!ciently high.
This result is related to the one in Morrison and White (2006) in that deposit insurance
helps correct a market failure and expands markets. In their work the market failure comes
from the sharing of surplus between banks and depositors. In contrast, in our model the
market failure is the inability to contract on bank monitoring directly and the necessity of
using the interest rate and capital to provide incentives.
We extend our model in a number of directions. First, we develop a version of the model
where borrowers obtain private beneﬁts and there is an incentive problem as in Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). Bank monitoring is necessary to reduce the private beneﬁts and alleviate
the borrower’s incentive problem. We argue that eects similar to those described above with
regard to banks’ use of capital will hold in this version. Second, we consider intermediate
market structures between monopoly and competition where only the interest of one group
is taken into account. Our main results remain valid in this case. Third, we analyze the case
4where banks can choose between relationship and transactional lending. The ﬁrst refers to the
monitored loan we have considered so far, and the second to a loan with a lower probability of
success but a higher payo in case of success. We show that capital regulation increases the
attractiveness of relationship loans relative to transactional loans. This is because capital
improves banks’ monitoring incentives when they are engaged in relationship lending but
it represents a pure cost in the case of transactional lending. Finally, we study the case
where banks have a franchise value from remaining in business as a way of introducing some
simple dynamic considerations. We ﬁnd that franchise value and capital are substitute ways
of providing banks with monitoring incentives. There is thus less need for capital regulation
when banks enjoy a large franchise value from remaining in business.
The paper has a number of empirical implications. First, the model suggests that banks
keep higher levels of capital when credit markets are competitive, in line with the empirical
ﬁnding in Schaeck and Cihak (2007) that banks hold higher capital ratios when operating
in a more competitive environment. Second, our analysis predicts that increased capital
requirements imply a shift in banks’ portfolios away from transactional lending towards
more relationship lending. Third, the analysis suggests that capital and franchise values
are substitute ways to improve banks’ monitoring incentives. Finally, our model oers some
cross-sectional implications concerning banks’ capital holdings and ﬁrms’ sources of borrow-
ing. Banks engaged in monitoring-intensive lending should be more capitalized than banks
operating in more transactional lending. To the extent that small banks are more involved
in more monitored lending to small and medium ﬁrms, the model predicts that small banks
should be better capitalized than larger banks, in line with the empirical ﬁndings in Alfon
et al. (2004) and Gropp and Heider (2007). Similarly, ﬁrms for which monitoring adds the
most value should prefer to borrow from banks with high capital. Billett et al. (1995) ﬁnd
that lender “identity,” in the sense of the lender’s credit rating, is an important determinant
of the market’s reaction to the announcement of a loan. To the extent that capitalization
improves a lender’s rating and reputation, these results are in line with the predictions of
our model.
Recent research on the role of bank capital has studied a variety of issues. Gale (2003,
2004) and Gale and Özgür (2005) consider the risk sharing function of bank capital and the
5implications for regulation. They show that less risk averse equity holders share risk with
more risk averse depositors. In contrast, in our model agents are risk neutral so risk sharing
plays no role in determining banks’ capital holdings.
Diamond and Rajan (2000) have considered the interaction between the role of capital
as a buer against shocks to asset values and banks’ role in the creation of liquidity. Closer
to our work, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) study the role of capital in determining banks’
lending capacities and providing incentives to monitor. Other studies such as Hellmann et al.
(2000), Repullo (2004) and Morrison and White (2005) analyze the role of capital in reducing
risk-taking. In contrast to these papers, our approach focuses on the relationship between
unconstrained markets and regulatory requirements and studies the circumstances under
which the market equilibrium is constrained e!cient and the nature of capital regulation
when it is not.
A possible explanation for excess capital based on dynamic considerations is suggested by
Blum and Hellwig (1995), Bolton and Freixas (2006), Peura and Keppo (2006), and Van den
Heuvel (2008). Banks choose a buer above the regulatory requirement as a way to ensure
they do not violate the regulatory constraint. In these models banks’ capital holdings would
still be altered by regulatory changes, something not often observed in the data. Our model
provides in a static framework an explanation for why capital holdings may be signiﬁcantly
above regulatory requirements and may not be driven by regulatory changes.
In our model, using capital commits the bank to monitor. With no deposit insurance,
this allows the bank to raise deposits more cheaply as depositors’ conﬁdence that they will
be repaid increases. On the lending side, the increased commitment to monitor makes a
bank with a large amount of capital more attractive to borrowers and thus improves its
“product market” opportunities. From this perspective, the use of capital in our model
is reminiscent of the literature on the interaction between capital structure and product
market competition, where debt has been identiﬁed as having a strategic role in committing
the ﬁrm to take actions it might not otherwise ﬁnd optimal (see, e.g., Brander and Lewis
(1986), Maksimovic (1988), and Maksimovic and Titman (1991)).
Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 considers banks’ choice of monitoring taking the
loan rates and capital amounts as given. The case where there is no deposit insurance is
6analyzed in Section 4, while the case with deposit insurance is investigated in Section 5.
Section 6 extends the analysis in various directions. Section 7 contains concluding remarks.
2M o d e l
Consider a simple one-period economy with ﬁrms and banks. The ﬁrms have access to a
risky investment project and need external funds to ﬁnance it. The banks lend to the ﬁrms
and monitor them. For ease of exposition, we assume throughout that each bank lends to
one ﬁrm.
Each ﬁrm’s investment project requires 1 unit of funds and yields a total payo of U
when successful and 0 when not. The ﬁrm raises the funds needed through a bank loan in
exchange for a promised total repayment uO.
The bank ﬁnances itself with an amount of capital n at a total cost uH  1 per unit, and
an amount of deposits 1  n at a total per unit (normalized) opportunity cost of 1.T h e
bank promises uG to depositors. The deposit market is perfectly competitive so that the
bank will always set uG at the level required for depositors to recover their opportunity cost
of funds of 1 and be willing to participate. In the case with no deposit insurance the bank
pays uG when its loans are repaid, and it pays 0 to depositors the rest of the time. In the
case of deposit insurance, depositors are always repaid either by the bank or by the deposit
insurance fund so that uG =1 . The assumption that uH  1 captures the idea that bank
capital is a more expensive form of ﬁnancing than deposits, as is typically assumed in the
literature.2
The function of banks in the economy is to provide monitoring and thus increase the
success probability of ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, the bank chooses an unobservable monitoring eort
t that for simplicity represents the success probability of the ﬁrm it ﬁnances. Monitoring
carries a cost of t2@2 for the bank. Our modelling of bank monitoring captures the idea
that ﬁrms and banks have complementary skills, so that banks can help ﬁrms increase their
expected value. Entrepreneurs have an expertise in running the ﬁrm. This consists of
2See Berger et al. (1995) for a discussion of this issue; and Gorton and Winton (2003), Hellmann et al.
(2000) and Repullo (2004) for a similar assumption. Mehran and Thakor (2006) provide a theoretical and
empirical analysis of the nature and magnitude of the cost of equity capital.
7operating the plant, managing the employees, and so forth. Banks provide complementary
ﬁnancial expertise and can thus help ﬁrms increase their expected value.3
This framework leads to a partial equilibrium analysis focusing on a single bank where the
amount of capital n> the loan rate uO, and the deposit rate uG are determined endogenously.
The deposit market is always competitive and the determination of uG depends on the
presence of deposit insurance. The determination of n and uO depends on the presence of a
regulator and on the structure of the loan market. All the variables other than t are publicly
observable. We consider two cases: in the ﬁrst one, which we call the “market case,” both
n and uO are determined by the bank, while in the other one, deﬁned as the “regulatory
case,” n is determined by a regulator who maximizes social welfare and uO is still set by the
bank. In either case the solution depends on the allocation of surplus in the credit market.
We analyze the two extreme situations where the bank acts as a monopolist or operates in
a perfectly competitive system. We discuss the intermediate case in Section 6.
The timing of the model is as follows. In the market case, the bank ﬁrst selects the level
of capital n and then sets the deposit rate uG and the loan rate uO. The ﬁrm chooses whether
to take the loan and invest in the risky project. Then the bank chooses the monitoring eort
t. The regulatory case works similarly with the only dierence that the regulator chooses
the level of capital n initially and then the bank sets uG and uO. Once chosen, n, uG,a n duO
are observable to all agents. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the model.
3 Equilibrium Bank Monitoring
We solve the model by backward induction, and begin with the bank’s optimal choice of
monitoring for a given amount of capital n,d e p o s i tr a t euG,a n dl o a nr a t euO. The bank
chooses its monitoring eo r ts oa st om a x i m i z ee x p e c t e dp r o ﬁ t sa sg i v e nb y
max





3See, e.g., Carletti (2004) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), for studies with related monitoring
technologies. This is also consistent with the idea of relationship lending in Boot and Thakor (2000). Note,
however, that this framework diers from others like Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in that the borrower does
not make any eort choice. We discuss this alternative framework in Section 6.
8The ﬁrst term, t(uO  (1  n)uG), represents the expected return to the bank obtained only
when the project succeeds net of the repayment to depositors. The second term, nuH,i st h e
opportunity cost of providing n units of capital, and the last term is the cost of monitoring.
The solution to this problem yields
t
W =m i n{uO  (1  n)uG>1} (2)
as the optimal level of monitoring for each bank. Note that, when tW ? 1, bank monitoring
eort is increasing in the loan rate uO as well as in the level of capital n the bank holds, but
it decreases in the deposit rate uG. Thus loan rates and capital are two alternative ways to
improve banks’ monitoring incentives.
This framework implies a moral hazard problem in the choice of monitoring when the
bank raises a positive amount of deposits. Since monitoring is unobservable, it cannot be
determined contractually. Given it is costly to monitor, the bank has a tendency not to
monitor properly unless it is provided with incentives to do so.
4N o D e p o s i t I n s u r a n c e
We now turn to the determination of the amount of capital n,t h el o a nr a t euO> and the
deposit rate uG. We start by analyzing the case where there is no deposit insurance. In
this case, the promised repayment must compensate depositors for the risk they face when
placing their money in banks that may not repay. This introduces a liability-side disciplining
force on bank behavior since banks have to bear the cost of their risk-taking through a higher
promised deposit rate. The expected value of the promised payment uG must be at least
equal to depositors’ opportunity cost of 1. Given the level of capital n and the loan rate uO,
depositors conjecture a level of monitoring for the bank, t, and set the deposit rate to meet





The deposit rate in (3) holds irrespective of the market structure in the loan market and
the presence of a regulator. By contrast, the determination of n and uO depends on both
9of these two elements. We consider ﬁrst the case where the bank acts as a monopolist in
the credit market, and then the case where it operates competitively. For either market
structure, we start with the “market” solution in the absence of regulation and we then turn
to the “regulatory” solution in which a regulator sets the level of capital.
4.1 Monopoly
We begin with the market solution in the case of monopoly banking where the bank sets
both n and uO. The bank’s maximization problem is given by:
max
n>uO>uG






t =m i n{uO  (1  n)uG>1}> (5)
tuG =1 > (6)




2  0> (7)
EV = t(U  uO)  0> (8)
0  n  1= (9)
The bank chooses n, uO,a n duG so to maximize its expected proﬁt subject to a number of
constraints. The ﬁrst constraint is the monitoring eo r tc h o s e nb yt h eb a n ki nt h eﬁ n a ls t a g e
after lending is determined. The second constraint is the depositors’ participation constraint
discussed above, which holds with equality given that the deposit market is competitive.
The third and fourth constraints are the bank’s and the borrowers’ participation constraints,
respectively. Note that the borrowers’ participation constraint boils down to uO  U if tA0.
The last constraint is simply a physical constraint on the level of capital.
The solution to this maximization problem yields the following result.
Proposition 1 In the case of monopoly banking and no deposit insurance, the market equi-
l i b r i u mi sa sf o l l o w s :
A. For U  2>nP =0 >u O = U>uG =1 >t=1 >EV=0 > and  = VZ = U  3
2;
10B. For 2  1
2uH  U?2>nP =2 UA0>u O = U>uG =1 >t =1 >EV =0 > and
 = VZ = 1
2  (2  U)uH;
C. For U?2  1
2uH, there is no intermediation.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The three regions in the proposition are shown in Figure 2. The intuition for the result is
as follows. Since the bank has monopoly power, it extracts as much surplus as possible from
the borrowers by always setting uO = U. Given that capital is costly, the bank prefers to
economize on its use and to derive incentives from the loan rate. In Region A where U  2>
uO is su!ciently high to ensure full monitoring even with no capital so nP =0 = T h ef a c tt h a t
the bank monitors fully ensures that depositors recover their opportunity cost and uG =1 .
In Region B, uO = U is not su!ciently high to provide incentives for full monitoring in the
absence of capital. Monitoring is, however, proﬁtable and the bank ﬁnds it optimal to keep
a positive amount of capital to obtain t =1and maintain uG =1 .I fU falls too low, then
the bank’s proﬁts become negative and there is no intermediation.
One interesting question is whether introducing capital regulation can improve social
welfare in this case. The regulator sets the amount of capital n in order to maximize social
w e l f a r eb u tt a k e st h el o a nr a t euO as set by the market. Here again the bank sets uO = U,
borrowers do not have any surplus and social welfare, deﬁned as VZ = +EV,j u s te q u a l s
. This implies that in this case the regulator has the same objective function and thus
chooses the same allocation as the market. We then have the following immediate result.
Proposition 2 In the case of monopoly banking and no deposit insurance, the regulator
chooses the same amount of capital as in the market solution, nuhj = nP. The market is
constrained e!cient.
Capital regulation has no role to play in the case of monopoly banking if deposits are not
insured. The bank reaps all the surplus from its monitoring eort since it sets uO = U> and
it internalizes the cost of its failure through the deposit rate uG. The liability-side discipline
exerted by depositors induces banks to keep a positive amount of capital when it is needed,
and this leaves no scope for capital regulation to improve welfare.
114.2 Perfect competition
We now turn to the determination of n, uO,a n duG in the case of perfectly competitive credit
markets. Given the level of monitoring (2) and the depositors’ participation constraint (3),
banks will have to set competitive contract terms in order to attract borrowers. The market
solution solves the following problem:
max
n>uO>uG
EV = t(U  uO) (10)
subject to (5)-(9) as before. The maximization problem diers from the monopoly case only
in that the contract now maximizes borrower surplus instead of the bank’s proﬁts. The
c o n s t r a i n t sa r et h es a m ea sb e f o r e .W eo b t a i nt h ef o l l o w i n g .
Proposition 3 In the case of competitive banking and no deposit insurance, the market
e q u i l i b r i u mi sa sf o l l o w s :
A. For U  2 1
2uH, nEV = 1
2uH, uO =2 1
2uH, uG =1 , t =1 , EV = VZ = U(2 1
2uH)
and  =0 ;
B. For U?2  1
2uH, there is no intermediation.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The results in Proposition 3 highlight how competition in the credit market aects the
use of bank capital. Similarly to the monopoly case, it is desirable to have the banks
fully monitor the ﬁrms so that t =1when projects are su!ciently proﬁtable that there
is intermediation (UA2  1
2uH). However, banks now derive incentives from a dierent
combination of loan rate and capital relative to the monopoly case. In particular, the loan
rate is lower and capital is higher relative to Proposition 1. The reason is straightforward.
As already mentioned, capital and loan rates are substitute ways to provide the bank with
incentives to monitor. These two instruments dier, however, in terms of their costs and
eects on borrower surplus and bank proﬁts. Borrowers prefer banks to hold high levels
of capital as a way to commit to high levels of monitoring. By contrast, since capital is
a costly input (i.e., uH  1), the bank would prefer to minimize its use and rather receive
incentives through a higher loan rate. While increasing uO is good for incentive purposes,
12its direct eect is to reduce the surplus to the borrowers. Given that with competition the
contract maximizes borrower surplus, the equilibrium when there is intermediation entails
the maximum level of capital and the lowest level of loan rate consistent with t =1and the
banks’ participation constraint. In this sense, market discipline can be imposed from the
asset side as both the loan rate and bank’s capital are used to provide banks with monitoring
incentives.4 In equilibrium, n decreases with the cost of capital uH while the loan rate uO
increases with uH. This result implies a negative correlation between capital and the loan
rate as a function of the cost of capital in the case of competition.
We next turn to analyze the optimal choice of capital when a regulator sets it to maximize
social welfare and the loan rate is still determined as part of a market solution that maximizes
the surplus of borrowers. Formally, a regulator solves the following problem:
max
n





subject to the usual constraints (5)-(7) and (9), and
uO =a r gm a x
u EV = t(U  u)  0= (12)
The regulatory problem diers from the market problem in the objective function, which
is now social welfare rather then just borrower surplus. The constraints have the usual
meaning, with constraint (12) indicating that the loan rate is still set in the market to
maximize borrowers’ surplus. The solution to (11) is given below.
Proposition 4 In the case of competitive banking and no deposit insurance, the regulatory
e q u i l i b r i u mi sa sf o l l o w s :
A.1. For U  2, nuhj =0 , uO =2 , uG =1 , t =1 , EV = U  2,  = 1
2, VZ = U  3
2;
A.2. For UDE  U?2, nuhj =1 U2
4 A 0, uO = U, uG = 2
U, t = U
2, EV =0 ,a n d
 = VZ = U2
8  (1  U2









4A related issue is studied in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), who analyze how banks can develop a
reputation for committing to devote resources to evaluating ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress and thus make the
correct renegotiation versus liquidation decisions. Borrowers who anticipate running into di!culties may
therefore prefer to borrow from banks with a reputation for ﬂexibility in dealing with ﬁrms in ﬁnancial
distress. Reputation thus serves as a commitment device for banks similarly to capital in our model.
13B. For 2  1
2uH  U?U DE, nuhj = 1
2uH A 0, uO =2 1
2uH, uG =1 , t =1 , EV = VZ =
U  (2  1
2uH),a n d =0 ;
C. For U?2  1
2uH, there is no intermediation.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3. The regulatory solution is quite dierent from
that in the monopoly case. In the latter, the loan rate is set to maximize the bank’s proﬁt,
which coincides with social welfare. Here the regulator can only choose nuhj but has to take
the loan rate uO as determined in the market, where it is set to maximize borrower surplus.
Given this, the equilibrium loan rate will often not coincide with the loan rate that maximizes
social welfare, as borrowers prefer a loan rate that allocates them a greater fraction of the
surplus than is socially optimal. Speciﬁcally, even though the regulator would prefer to use
the loan rate to provide banks with incentives - it is a transfer that does not aect directly
the level of social welfare - in its choice of nuhj the regulator has to take into account how
the market solution for uO aects banks’ incentives to monitor. This can imply a dierent
regulatory level of capital than with monopoly.
In Region A.1 of Proposition 4, projects are so proﬁtable that the equilibrium loan rate
uO =2is su!cient to provide banks with incentives to fully monitor even if they hold no
capital. The regulator therefore sets nuhj =0 , the loan rate is set just equal to the level that
guarantees t =1 , and both banks and borrowers earn positive returns.
As the project return U falls below 2, the loan rate by itself is no longer enough to
support full monitoring (t =1 ) without capital. The regulator then has a choice between
(a) keeping the capital requirement low and uO as high as possible, but recognizing that
monitoring will be reduced; or (b) requiring that banks hold more capital so as to maintain
complete monitoring. In the ﬁrst case the regulator sets the level of capital such that the
market maximizes borrower surplus by setting uO equal to U= Any lower level of uO leads to
a subsequent level of monitoring by the bank that is insu!cient to ensure depositors receive
their opportunity cost; depositors will then not lend. Any higher level of uO violates the
borrowers’ participation constraint. This solution is optimal in Region A.2.
14In the second case the regulator uses a high level of capital to ensure that banks have the
correct incentives to monitor. The market then lowers uO so that borrower surplus is made
as large as possible. The limit to this process is set by the participation constraint of the
banks. In equilibrium uO is set so that the banks earn zero proﬁts and borrowers capture the
entire surplus. This solution is optimal in Region B. The boundary U = UDE is where the
two types of solution give the same level of social welfare. Finally, as before, as the project
return falls below U =2 1
2uH, we enter Region C where there is no intermediation.
Comparing Proposition 4 with Proposition 1 it can be seen that the regulatory solution
with competition is the same as the monopoly solution for U  2 except for the loan rate,
which is now just enough to reach full monitoring. For U?2 the comparison depends on the
region on which one focuses. In Region A.2 of Proposition 4, less capital is mandated by the
regulator with perfect competition than is used with monopoly since 1 U2
4 = 2+U
4 (2U) ?
2U= Monitoring is lower as a result and it can be shown using UA2 1
2uH that social welfare
is also strictly lower. In Region B of Proposition 4 more capital is mandated by the regulator
with perfect competition than with monopoly because in this region 1
2uH A 2U.S i n c et =1
in both cases it follows that social welfare is again lower with regulated perfect competition
than with monopoly. In the context of our model at least, a monopolistic market structure is
preferable to a competitive one. The intuition is that since banks provide a socially valuable,
but costly, function, they will provide a suboptimal amount of monitoring unless properly
compensated.
We now turn to the comparison between the market solution and the regulatory solution
in the case of a competitive credit market. We have the following immediate result.
Proposition 5 In the case of competitive banking and no deposit insurance:
A. For U  UDE the market solution entails a higher level of capital than the regulatory
solution, nEV An uhj;
B. For 2 1
2uH  U?U DE, the market and the regulatory solutions entail the same level
of capital, nEV = nuhj.
Figure 3 illustrates the proposition (note that Region A comprises A.1 and A.2 from
Proposition 4). The results show that in the case of competitive banking the market solution
15is ine!cient as it induces banks to hold ine!ciently high levels of capital when the return
of the project is su!ciently high. The basic intuition is that whereas the regulator prefers
to economize on the use of costly capital and provide incentives through the loan rate, the
market prefers to use capital as long as this is consistent with banks’ participation constraint.
This implies that banks always break even in the market solution ( =0 ), while they make
positive proﬁts in the regulatory solution in Regions A.1 and A.2 of Proposition 4. As the
project return falls below UDE and banks break even in the regulatory solution, the market
solution coincides with the regulatory one and the market equilibrium is constrained e!cient.
To sum up, the common argument made in the literature is that if capital is relatively
costly then banks will minimize its use. This leads to a moral hazard because banks are
undercapitalized. Capital regulation is required to ensure that banks do not take excessive
risk. In this section we have analyzed a simple model of bank moral hazard and shown
that the conventional wisdom does not hold. When there is monopoly power the market
allocation is e!cient and no regulation is necessary. With perfect competition there is a
market failure. However, the problem is that banks use too much capital despite it being a
costly form of ﬁnance. The nature of the regulation that is necessary to stop this market
failure (if it is feasible) is to impose a maximum amount of capital that banks can use. We
next turn to the case where there is deposit insurance to see how this alters the analysis.
5 Deposit Insurance
The standard argument in the context of deposit insurance is that it makes funds more easily
available to banks and this accentuates banks’ moral hazard problem. Capital regulation is
then required to oset the increased moral hazard problem. The purpose of this section is
to investigate this argument in the context of our model. As before we distinguish the cases
of monopoly and competitive banking. In both instances we focus on how much capital is
used in the market versus the regulatory solution. In Subsection 5.3 we analyze the eects
of deposit insurance compared to the scenarios with no deposit insurance.
165.1 Monopoly
We start by characterizing the market solution under monopoly banking. As before, the bank
chooses both n and uO to maximize its expected proﬁts, taking into account its subsequent
monitoring choice and the fact that the ﬁrm accepts the loan only if it has a non-negative
surplus. In contrast to the previous section, the government now guarantees the deposits of
savers: if the bank goes bankrupt the government pays the depositors. We assume the cost
of this deposit insurance is paid from revenues raised by non-distortionary lump sum taxes.
The amount that banks promise to pay depositors is therefore just uG =1 .
The monopoly bank’s proﬁt-maximizing contract now solves the following problem:
max
n>uO





subject to (5) and (7) with uG =1 , (8) and (9). The problem is the same as in the case
without deposit insurance in Section 4.1 with the only dierence that now uG is simply equal
to one and therefore no longer appears as a constraint.
The solution to this maximization problem yields the following result.
Proposition 6 In the case of monopoly banking with deposit insurance, the market equilib-
rium always entails nP =0 , uO = U,a n d EV =0 . The rest is as follows:
A. For U  2, t =1and  = VZ = U  3
2;
B. For 1  U?2, t = U  1 and  =
(U31)2
2 .T h e n ,VZ = U2
2  3
2 T 0 for U T
s
3.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
As in the case without deposit insurance, the bank retains all the surplus from the
investment project by setting uO = U and the ﬁrm is indierent between taking the loan
and not. However, unlike the case without deposit insurance, here the bank never holds
any capital. The presence of deposit insurance worsens the bank’s incentive problem as it
magniﬁes the limited liability problem: the bank does not fully internalize the cost of failure
since it pays depositors only when its loans succeed. The deposit rate is now independent of
the level of bank monitoring and thus the bank no longer ﬁnds it worthwhile to use capital
to commit to monitor. The level of uO is su!cient to ensure full monitoring in Region A,
17while in Region B, when project returns are lower, full monitoring is no longer optimal and
t falls below one.
Finally, it is interesting to note that with deposit insurance intermediation is always
feasible but that for U?
s
3 social welfare is negative. The bank would like to lend because
its proﬁts are positive but this is because it does not bear the cost of deposit insurance.
There would be no intermediation in this region (for U?
s
3) if the institution insuring
depositors refused to provide the insurance.
Given that the bank minimizes its holding of capital when there is deposit insurance,
capital regulation now has the potential to improve e!ciency and increase social surplus.
Because of deposit insurance, the bank chooses the level of capital so as to maximize its
expected proﬁts and does not fully internalize the cost of its failure. By contrast, a regulator
interested in maximizing social welfare considers the cost borne by the deposit insurance
fund in case of bank default and solves the following problem:
max
n
VZ =  + EV  (1  t)(1  n)





subject to (5), (8), (9) and
uO =a r gm a x
u (u)  0> (15)
with uG =1 . The optimization problem is similar to before. The regulator chooses n to
maximize social welfare taking the loan rate as set by the market. Solving the maximization
problem above leads to the following result.
Proposition 7 In the case of monopoly banking with deposit insurance, the regulatory equi-
librium always entails uO = U and EV =0 . The rest is as follows:
A. For U  2, nuhj =0 , t =1and  = VZ = U  3
2;
B. For pd{{uH>U EH} ?U?2, nuhj =2 U, t =1and  = VZ = 1
2  (2  U)uH,
where UEH =2 1
2uH;
C. For UFH ?U?u H ? 2, nuhj =2uH, t =1(uH U),  = 1
2[1(uH U)]2 (2
uH)uH,a n dVZ =   (uH  U),w h e r eUFH = uH  2+
p




3 ?U?2 and uH  2, nuhj =0 , t = U1,  = 1
2(U1)2,a n dVZ = 1
2U2 3
2;
18E. For U?U EH, U?U FH, U?
s
3,a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e4 ,VZ ? 0 and there is no
intermediation.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
T h em o s ti m p o r t a n ti n s i g h to ft h ep r o p o s i t i o ni st h a tw e l f a r em a x i m i z a t i o nm a yr e q u i r e
a positive level of capital. This occurs when raising capital has an incentive eect in that
it increases the monitoring eort of the bank (i.e., when U?2)a n dw h e nt h ep o s i t i v e
incentive eect on social welfare of raising capital outweighs the cost uH (i.e., when uH ? 2).
Capital regulation is therefore a second best solution to the distortion of deposit insurance.
When deposits are fully insured, banks can reduce monitoring without having to pay more
to depositors. Banks are thus more likely to default, with the deposit insurance fund left to
make up the dierence. By forcing banks to hold a positive amount of capital, regulation
improves banks’ monitoring incentives and reduces the disbursement of the deposit insurance
fund, as in, for example, Hellmann et al. (2000), Repullo (2004) and Morrison and White
(2005).
It is interesting to note that, as in the case without deposit insurance, there is now again
a region where there is no intermediation. Since the regulator’s objective is to maximize
social welfare, the regulator prefers to prevent intermediation from occuring whenever VZ
is negative as in Region E. One way that the regulator could do this would be to eliminate
the provision of deposit insurance. Another would be to set nuhj su!ciently high that banks’
participation constraint is violated.
Comparing Propositions 6 and 7 leads to the following immediate result.
Proposition 8 In the case of monopoly banking and deposit insurance, capital regulation
requires that banks hold a higher amount of capital than in the market solution, nuhj An P,
in Regions B and C as deﬁned in Proposition 7. Outside of these regions nuhj = nP and the
market is constrained e!cient.
This result is illustrated in Figure 4. It establishes that in our framework a regulator
m a yr e q u i r eah i g h e ra m o u n to fc a p i t a lt h a nt h ea m o u n tt h a tm a x i m i z e st h eb a n k ’ sp r o ﬁ t s .
When this happens regulation is beneﬁcial as it increases social welfare relative to what
19w o u l db eo b t a i n e du n d e rt h em a r k e ts o l u t i o n . I nt h e s ei n s t a n c e s ,t h e r ei sar a t i o n a l ef o r
capital regulation as a way of providing the bank with incentives to monitor. This is entirely
d u et ot h ep r e s e n c eo fd e p o s i ti n s u r a n c ew h i c ha l l o w st h eb a n kt ot a k ea d v a n t a g eo ft h e
implicit subsidy provided by regulation. This case corresponds to the conventional wisdom
discussed earlier that the distortion imposed by deposit insurance requires capital regulation
to correct it. Notice that this only holds for low uH and U. For other values the market is
constrained e!cient.
5.2 Perfect competition
We start by considering how a perfectly competitive market operates when there is deposit
insurance and no capital regulation. The market sets n and uO to maximize borrower surplus
subject to the usual constraints, again assuming that uG =1 . Solving this problem gives the
following result.
Proposition 9 In the case of competitive banking with deposit insurance, in the market
equilibrium it always holds that uO ?Uso EV A 0,a n d =0 . The level of capital, loan
rate and monitoring are as follows:
A. For U  UDE, nEV = 1
2uH, uO =2 nEV, t =1and EV = VZ = U  (2  1
2uH);













2uHnEV ? 1, EV = t(U  1+nEV  t) and VZ = tU  t2  (1  nEV) T 0 for
U T min{UDE> b U},w h e r eb U solves VZ(b U)=t b U  t2  (1  nEV)=0 .




2 for uH ? 3




Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The results in Proposition 9 highlight again the incentive mechanisms for bank monitoring
that are used in a competitive credit market. As already mentioned, capital and loan rates
are substitute ways to provide banks with monitoring incentives. Borrowers prefer that
banks charge lower interest rates and hold large amounts of capital, whereas banks prefer to
minimize the use of capital and receive incentives through a higher loan rate. Given that the
20market solution maximizes borrower surplus, the equilibrium involves the maximum amount
of capital consistent with banks’ participation constraint and provides a loan rate up to the
point where the (marginal) positive incentive eect of a higher loan rate equals its negative
direct eect on borrower surplus. Thus, in addition to capital, the loan rate is still used to
provide monitoring incentives - and thus market discipline - from the asset side. However,
the market solution may now entail a lower level of monitoring relative to the case without
deposit insurance.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 5. In both regions the zero-proﬁt constraint for
banks binds. If it did not it would always be possible to increase EV by lowering uO and
increasing n while holding t constant. The exact amounts of monitoring and capital in
equilibrium depend on the return U of investment projects and on the cost of capital uH.
In Region A project returns are high and it is worth setting a high uO and n to ensure full
monitoring. With the lower returns in Region B, both uO and n are reduced and t?1.
One interesting feature of the equilibrium is that, much like in the previous subsection
(and dierently from the case without deposit insurance), there is always lending because of
deposit insurance. Deposits can always be raised at uG =1and since they only have to be
repaid by the bank when its loans pay o,i ti sa l w a y sp o s s i b l et oc r e a t ep o s i t i v eb o r r o w e r
surplus and satisfy the zero proﬁt constraint. As in the monopoly case, VZ ? 0 for low
enough U because of the cost of repaying depositors when the bank fails.
Following the same structure as before, we now turn to analyze the optimal choice of
capital from a social welfare perspective when there is competition and loan rates are set as
part of a market solution to maximize the return to borrowers. The solution to this gives
the following result.
Proposition 10 In the case of competitive banking with deposit insurance, the regulatory
e q u i l i b r i u mi sa sf o l l o w s :
A. nuhj =0 , uO = U+1
2 , t =1 , EV A 0,  A 0,a n dVZ A 0;
B. nuhj =3 U, uO = U  1, t =1 , EV A 0,  A 0,a n dVZ A 0;
C. nuhj = U+14(uH 1), uO =2 ( uH 1), t = U2(uH 1) ? 1, EV A 0,  A 0,a n d
VZ A 0;
21D. nuhj =0 , uO = U
2, t = U31
2 ? 1, EV A 0,  A 0,a n dVZ A 0;
E. nuhj = 1
2uH, uO =2 1
2uH, t =1 , EV = VZ A 0,  =0 ;
F. There is no intermediation because VZ ? 0.
The boundaries deﬁning regions A through F are shown in Figure 6 and, together with
the expressions for EV>> and VZ, are deﬁned in the appendix.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 6. As usual, both capital and the loan rate are
used to provide monitoring incentives, and their exact amounts depend on the return of the
project U and the cost of equity uH.I nR e g i o nA ,U is su!ciently large that it is possible for
the regulator to set nuhj =0and still have full monitoring, with incentives being provided
by the loan rate uO. Both proﬁts and borrower surplus are positive in this region. For lower
U, in Region B, borrowers prefer to reduce uO, thus providing lower incentives through the
interest rate. Since uH is relatively low, the remaining incentives to monitor are provided
by the use of capital, nuhj. In Region C, the regulator uses less capital since uH is higher,
and it is no longer optimal to provide full incentives to monitor, so that t?1.I nR e g i o n
D capital is too expensive to be worth using to provide incentives to monitor and imperfect
incentives are provided through uO alone. In Region E the regulator uses capital to make
up for low incentives provided by a low value of uO. In Region F there is no intermediation
since VZ ? 0. As in Proposition 7, this is achieved by not providing deposit insurance or
by setting nuhj su!ciently high to violate banks’ participation constraint.
We next compare the market and regulatory solutions. The comparison between the
values of nEV and nuhj leads to the following result.
Proposition 11 With competition and deposit insurance the comparison between the market
and the regulatory solutions is as follows:
A. nEV An uhj;
B. nEV = nuhj;
C. nEV ?n uhj.
D. No intermediation with regulation.
22The boundaries deﬁning regions A-C are shown in Figure 7 and are deﬁned in the appen-
dix.
Proof: See the appendix. ¤
For the case studied in Section 4.2, with competition and no deposit insurance, the
market solution is either constrained e!cient or uses too much capital. It can be seen from
Proposition 11 and Figure 7 that both of these cases still arise with deposit insurance. The
competitive solution uses too much capital in Region A where U is high. As before, the
reason is that in the competitive solution borrowers are always better o with lower uO
and higher capital as long as this is consistent with banks’ participation constraint. The
regulator, on the other hand, prefers to use a lower level of capital and provide incentives
through a higher interest rate. In Region B the market solution is constrained e!cient. Only
in the relatively small area denoted as Region C does both intermediation occur and optimal
regulation require a level of capital above the market solution. Thus the main conclusion
of Section 4 remains valid even when there is deposit insurance. The basic tendency with
competition is for there to be too much capital used in the market solution rather than too
little.
5.3 The eects of deposit insurance
In this subsection we consider the eect of deposit insurance by comparing the dierent
cases without and with deposit insurance. We start with the eect on monitoring incen-
tives. Without deposit insurance banks have an incentive to fully monitor (t =1 )b o t h
under monopoly (Proposition 1) and under competition (Proposition 3) as long as there is
intermediation. With deposit insurance banks monitor less (t?1)f o rU?2 in the case
of monopoly (Proposition 6) and for U?U DE in the case of competition (Proposition 9).
Similar results hold for the regulatory solutions under both monopoly and competition. The
reason for the higher monitoring without deposit insurance is that an increase in t lowers
uG so that there is an additional incentive to monitor with the result that t =1always
holds. Such an ee c ti sa b s e n tw i t hd e p o s i ti n s u r a n c ea st h ed e p o s i tr a t ei suG =1and
is independent of the degree of bank monitoring. By failing to reduce the bank’s cost of
23raising deposits when the probability of bankruptcy decreases, deposit insurance introduces
a negative force on bank monitoring.
As a result of this eect of deposit insurance on monitoring, social welfare is usually lower
when U is low compared to the case of no deposit insurance. However, this is not always so.
In some cases deposit insurance can entail a positive eect on the level of social welfare as it
provides a way of guaranteeing payments to depositors without involving the use of costly
capital. This occurs when the reduction in the use of costly capital more than outweighs the
negative incentive eect of deposit insurance on monitoring incentives. This is illustrated in
Figure 8 for the market solutions in the monopoly case without and with deposit insurance
as described in Propositions 1 and 6.
Consider the levels of social welfare in these propositions without and with deposit in-










 (2  U)uH,
which has the boundary
U =2 ( uH  1)=
This leads to Region A in Figure 8 where socially valuable intermediation is feasible in both
cases but social welfare is higher with deposit insurance than without. The no intermediation
boundary in Proposition 1 is U =2 1@2uH w h i l et h eo n ei nP r o p o s i t i o n6i sU =
s
3.
Thus the case with deposit insurance involves socially valuable intermediation while the





3  U?2  1@2uH.
Similar qualitative results on the role of deposit insurance are obtained in the regulatory
solution with monopoly. In contrast, in the case of competition deposit insurance either
makes no dierence if U is su!ciently high or leads to a reduction in social welfare.
It is also interesting to note that there are fewer parameter values where nEV An uhj in
the market solution when there is deposit insurance. This can be easily seen by comparing
Propositions 5 and 11. As illustrated in Figure 3, the boundary for nEV An uhj to occur
without deposit insurance is always below U =2 , while with deposit insurance it is always
24above U =2 , as shown in Figure 7. Therefore, nEV An uhj occurs for a larger range of
parameter values without deposit insurance than with. The reason is again that deposit
i n s u r a n c eb l u n t sm o n i t o r i n gi n c e n t i v e sa n dt h u sm o r ec a p i t a lm u s tb eu s e di nt h er e g u l a t o r y
equilibrium to provide incentives.
We have assumed that deposit insurance is funded using general revenues raised by non-
distortionary lump sum taxes. If distortionary taxes are used then the eective cost of
deposit insurance will be higher. Another possibility is to directly charge the banks for
deposit insurance. Since the banks have limited liability it will be necessary to cover the
cost of deposit insurance when they are solvent. The higher charge for deposit insurance
that this leads to will likely also result in a distortion.
6E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we consider a few important extensions. First, we consider an alternative
framework where the borrower exerts eort and monitoring helps alleviate the resulting moral
hazard. Second, we consider alternative market structures where both banks and borrowers
obtain part of the surplus generated by the investment projects. Third, we analyze the
case with a classic asset substitution problem where banks can choose loans with a lower
probability of success but with a higher payo in case of success. This extension can be used
to obtain insight on the role of capital in the context of relationship versus transactional
lending. Finally, we study the case where banks have a franchise value from continuing to
operate, which introduces some simple dynamic considerations.
6.1 The monitoring technology
So far we have assumed that bank monitoring directly determines the probability of success
of the investment project. This simpliﬁes the analysis in that the borrower does not exert
any eort. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) use a dierent framework where bank monitoring
reduces borrowers’ private beneﬁts. We adapt their approach so that monitoring inﬂuences
the project success probability only indirectly. Speciﬁcally, assume that the ﬁrm invests in
a project which, as before, yields a total payo of U when successful and 0 when not. The
25probability of success depends now on the eort of the borrower. In particular, the borrower
chooses an unobservable eort h 5 [0>1] that determines the probability of success of the
project and carries a cost of h2@2. The borrower also enjoys a (nonpecuniary) private beneﬁt
(1h)EA0, which is maximized when he exerts no eort. One way of interpreting the cost
hE is that putting in eort reduces the amount of time the borrower can spend pursuing
privately beneﬁcial activities, or enjoying the perks of being in charge of the project. Bank
monitoring helps alleviate moral hazard in this framework. In particular, the bank chooses
a monitoring eort t which reduces the private beneﬁt of the borrower to (1  h)E(1  t)
and entails a cost of t2@2. We can think of bank monitoring as taking the form of using
accounting and other controls to reduce the borrower’s private eort, or to reduce his ability
to consume perks. Monitoring is chosen before the borrower’s eort.
Given this set up, for given n, uG,a n duO, the borrower chooses his eort to maximize







W =m i n{(U  uO)  E(1  t)>1}.
The bank chooses t to maximize
 = h






t =m i n{(uO  (1  n)uG)E>1}=
It can be seen that this version of the model works similarly to our basic model. The
borrower’s eort decreases with the loan rate uO and the private beneﬁt E while it increases
with the project return U and the monitoring eort t. Bank monitoring in turn increases
in the loan rate uO, the level of capital n and the private beneﬁt E. Thus, as before, bank
monitoring positively aects the success probability of the project as it reduces borrower’s
moral hazard. The dierence is that, as in Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), in setting the loan
rate uO the bank will now have to consider also the negative eect that this has on the
borrower’s eort so that in equilibrium its level will be somewhere in between the levels
26found in the analysis above in the case of monopoly and perfect competition. This implies
also dierent levels of capital and of monitoring in equilibrium, but it does not aect the
qualitative results. In particular, there will again often be a tendency for banks to use too
much capital rather than too little.
6.2 Alternative market structures
The analysis above has focused on the extreme cases of monopoly and perfect competition.
The key issue is what the contract maximizes. In the monopoly case the contract maximizes
the bank’s proﬁt and the bank gets the surplus. The high surplus provides banks with
incentives to monitor e!ciently with no or little capital. At the other extreme, with perfect
competition borrower surplus is maximized and capital is used in the market solution to
provide incentives for banks to monitor. Because capital is costly, competition can lead
to ine!ciencies and capital regulation may be needed to limit these ine!ciencies. With
intermediate market structures surplus is split between banks and borrowers, with each
obtaining a positive expected return. The eects identiﬁed above will remain in such cases.
In particular, the more surplus that banks obtain the less capital they will use. The more
surplus borrowers obtain the greater will be the tendency for banks to use capital. This
suggests the empirical prediction that the more competitive is the banking sector, the greater
the amount of capital that will be used. This prediction is consistent with the result in
Schaeck and Cihak (2007) that European banks tend to hold higher capital ratios when
operating in a more competitive environment.
6.3 Relationship and transactional lending
We have assumed throughout that banks can only ﬁnance projects that beneﬁt from mon-
itoring. In that context, we have shown that capital plays a role as a commitment device
for banks to monitor and thus attract borrowers. We now modify this basic framework and,
similarly to Boot and Thakor (2000), we consider the case where banks can choose between
investing in a project which is identical to the one studied so far, and an alternative project
with a ﬁxed success probability sW of returning a payo UW. We will refer to the ﬁrst kind
of loan as a “relationship” loan since it beneﬁts from the interaction with the bank, and the
27latter loan as a “transactional” loan. The crucial dierence is that bank monitoring aects
only the success probability of the relationship loan, given as before by t. As a consequence,
the bank’s capital holdings will now aect the relative attractiveness of the two projects and
capital regulation will play the additional role of aecting the distribution of bank funds
across projects.
Assume that sW ?t (0) ? 1, UW AU ,a n dsWUW ?t (0)U,w h e r et(n) is the level of
monitoring for a relationship loan when the bank has capital n. The transactional project
has a lower probability of success than a relationship loan even with no capital (n =0 ), a
higher payo in case of success, but a lower expected payo. These assumptions introduce the
possibility of a classic asset substitution problem. Banks may prefer to make transactional
loans even though relationship loans are more valuable socially. Capital regulation can help
to correct this market failure.
To analyze the bank’s choice in more detail, consider, for example, the case of monopoly
banking where banks set the loan rate to obtain all the returns from the projects and have
expected proﬁts equal to





W = sW(UW  (1  n)uG)  nuH>
from the relationship and the transactional loans, respectively. We ﬁrst note that
CW
Cn =
sWuG  uH ? 0 so that capital decreases the attractiveness of the transactional loan and
t h eb a n kw o u l dn o tw a n tt oh o l da n yc a p i t a lw h e ni n v e s t i n gi nt h i sp r o j e c t . T h i si m p l i e s
that capital regulation has the additional role of aecting the distribution of funds towards
socially valuable investment projects. In situations where the asset substitution problem
leads to an ine!ciency, a minimum capital requirement can be used to rule out transactional
lending and ensure relationship lending. Such a requirement will need to be higher the higher
are UW and uG. Once this capital regulation is in place, the factors considered in the basic
model concerning relationship lending will come into play. Capital is further used to provide
monitoring incentives, and our main result that capital can be too high relative to the social
welfare maximizing level will still hold. In this case optimal regulation will involve both a
28maximum and a minimum capital requirement.
Besanko and Kanatas (1996) also consider a model with bank monitoring of loans and
an asset substitution problem. In their model there is an agency problem between managers
and other shareholders in the bank. Among other things, they show that an increase in
capital requirements may lead to increased risk taking. The reason is that raising equity
dilutes current managers’ stake in the ﬁrm and this can reduce managers’ incentives to exert
eort. In our model there is no agency problem between managers and shareholders. Our
results hold for banks where the interests of managers and shareholders are strongly aligned
through a range of contractual provisions so that there is no dilution eect. If we were
to introduce a similar agency problem, capital could have an additional, negative eect on
monitoring incentives and could therefore be used less than in our current framework. In
particular, raising capital could penalize banks engaging in relationship lending as it could
have a negative eect on the success probability of their loans through a lower monitoring
eort.
The considerations developed above also have implications for the penetration of banks
into foreign markets and their need for staying power. There has been much discussion
in recent years on the di!culties banks face when attempting to expand internationally.
Information asymmetries developed through long term relationships, for instance, have been
identiﬁed as possible barriers to entry, leading entrant banks to focus their entry decisions
toward market segments less subject to private information (see Dell’Ariccia and Marquez,
2004, and Marquez, 2002). Clarke et al. (2001) and Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004)
provide evidence that this is indeed the case for banks’ foreign penetration in Latin American
countries. These results point to the need for entrant banks to have a competitive edge
particularly in markets where they suer larger information disadvantages. Bank capital
endows banks with just such an advantage in attracting borrowers by providing a channel
through which they can commit to monitor. In the context of our model, therefore, we
would expect well-capitalized entrant banks to have more “staying power” when entering a
market. Well capitalized (entrant) banks should be in a better position to monitor borrowers
subject to information problems, and should be most attractive to borrowers that beneﬁt
most from this monitoring. To the extent that this staying power is most relevant for
29relationship lending - one area identiﬁed as being information intensive - we would expect
that well-capitalized banks should obtain a disproportionately higher share of relationship
loans.
6.4 Bank franchise value
Much discussion of bank behavior has focused on the role of franchise value as a possible
way to reduce risk-taking (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990). Franchise value acts as an additional
instrument providing a commitment to monitor. The intuition is simply that a greater
franchise value means that the bank has a larger incentive to remain viable and in business,
which leads it to dedicate more resources to monitor its borrowers so as to increase the
success probability of its loans. As a consequence, the optimal level of capital needed to
provide monitoring incentives is lower than without franchise value.
We endogenize the franchise value by characterizing the equilibrium of the dynamic model
that is just a repeated version of our model. If a bank stays solvent it is able to continue to
the next period. If it defaults it goes out of business. Introducing a discount factor of  and
at i m ei n d e xw for each period, the franchise value at date w, denoted by IYw,i sg i v e nb yt h e
current proﬁts and the discounted value of the franchise value at date w +1so






The maximization of IY w leads to a monitoring eo r ta tt i m ew, tw,e q u a lt o
tw =m i n {uOw  (1  nw)uGw + IYw+1>1}=
For interior solutions a higher franchise value leads to higher monitoring. Given the problem
is the same in each period, the optimal solution must be the same each period and thus
IYw = IYw+1 = IY. Taking the interior solution for t and eliminating the w indexing, we
can then express IY as




















From this, it can be seen that the franchise value depends positively on the bank’s static
proﬁt  and equals zero whenever  =0 . Thus, the role of the franchise value in reducing
risk-taking depends crucially on the market structure of the credit market in that bank
proﬁts will usually be higher in monopolistic markets than in competitive markets. It may
also depend on the presence or absence of regulation since, as shown above, optimal capital
regulation may entail setting a capital requirement that provides banks with rents, even
when the market is competitive.
7 Concluding Remarks
A standard view of capital regulation is that it osets the risk-taking incentives provided by
deposit insurance. A common approach in the study of bank regulation has been to assume
that any capital requirements will be binding, since equity capital is generally believed to
be more costly than other forms of ﬁnance. However, in many cases banks hold large levels
of capital and regulatory requirements appear not to be binding. Moreover, banks’ capital
holdings seem to have varied substantially over time independently of regulatory changes.
In this paper we have developed an alternative view of capital that is consistent with the
observation that banks may hold high levels of capital even above the levels required by
regulation.
Our approach is based on the idea that both the loan rate charged by the bank and
capital provide incentives to monitor. We adopt the standard assumption in the literature
that capital is more costly than other sources of funds. In the benchmark case of no deposit
insurance, a monopolistic market structure leads to a constrained e!cient allocation. With
perfect competition the market provides incentives for banks to use too much capital because
borrowers prefer lower interest rates and higher capital as they do not bear the cost of the
capital. A regulator would want to reduce the amount of capital they use. When there is
deposit insurance banks’ incentives to monitor are reduced. With a monopolistic market
structure banks do not use any capital because they ignore the cost of default to the deposit
31insurance fund. A regulator that takes this into account requires banks to use more capital.
In the case of competitive markets the basic tendency is for banks to use too much capital as
in the case of no deposit insurance. There are relatively few parameter values where banks
use too little capital. Deposit insurance usually lowers social welfare but there are some
cases where it can improve it.
There are many interesting directions for future research. In our model we assume that
all banks are the same and operate in either monopolistic or perfectly competitive mar-
kets. Dierently, Boot and Marin˘ c (2006) consider heterogeneous banks with a ﬁxed cost of
monitoring operating in markets with dierent degrees of competition. Incorporating these
elements into our framework is one of these interesting directions.
We have focused on regulatory capital that maximizes social welfare. A number of other
approaches are possible. In many instances it seems that actual regulatory capital levels
have been set based on historically observed levels. Basel II represents another type of
approach where regulatory capital is derived from the criterion of covering the bank’s losses
99.9% of the time. The discrete version of the model we have developed is not appropriate
for analyzing this type of criterion. A version with a continuous distribution of returns is
necessary. Developing this extension of our model is another interesting topic for future
research.
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Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting (6) into (5) when t?1 and solving for the equilib-






O  4(1 n)
´






O  4(1 n)
´
,w i t ht1 At 2. The relevant solution is t1,a si tc a nb e
shown that both banks and borrowers are better o with the higher level of monitoring. To
see this, note that, in equilibrium, bank proﬁts are given by
(t)=t(uO  (1  n)
1
t









which is strictly increasing in t for t  1  uO.S i n c e t2 ?t 1 ?u O,b a n k sp r e f e rt h e
equilibrium with the higher level of monitoring. The equilibrium return for ﬁrms is just
equal to zero when there is monopoly banking so that ﬁrms are indierent between the two
solutions of t. Since also depositors are indierent between the two levels of monitoring as
they just receive their opportunity cost of funds in expectation, the higher level of monitoring,
t1, yields a Pareto-superior equilibrium and is therefore the relevant solution. This implies
that













We now turn to the determination of uO and n. Consider ﬁrst the case when t =1 . Then,
C
CuO =1so that in equilibrium uO = U;a n dC
Cn =( 1 uH) ? 0 for uH A 1 so that the bank
would like to choose n as small as possible given t =1 . To see when this holds, we substitute







>1}.T h i si m p l i e st =1for n =0
when U  2= Using this in (16) gives  = U  3@2= Since uO = U implies EV =0 ,w ea l s o
have VZ = = This gives part A of the proposition.
Consider now the case when t?1.W eh a v e
C
CuO









O  4(1  n))31
2 A 0 given that u2
O  4(1  n) A 0 for an equilibrium




2tA1 from the bank’s participation
constraint that   0. Hence in equilibrium it is again the case that uO = U.
To ﬁnd the optimal level of n with t?1, we ﬁrst show that  is a concave function of
n. Substituting t into  and dierentiating with respect to n,w eo b t a i n
C
Cn
=( U  t)
Ct
Cn
 (uH  1)> (18)
where
Ct
Cn =( U2  4(1  n))31










Cn =( U2  4(1  n))31
2 A 0 and
C2t
Cn2 = 2(U2  4(1  n))33
2 ? 0 for t?1.
We can now ﬁnd the optimal level of n from the ﬁrst order condition. Substituting the
expressions for t as in (17) and
Ct




















For this to be the optimal solution, it has to be consistent with the conditions t  1 and
  0.S u b s t i t u t i n g nW into the expression for t as in (17), we obtain t =
uHU
2uH31 so that
t  1 if U  2 1
uH. Substituting the expressions for nW and t into the expression for  and
solving the boundary  =0for U,w eh a v et h a t  0 if U  2
q
1  1
2uH.I ti se a s yt os e e
that these two conditions on U are inconsistent as 2
q
1  1
2uH A 2(1  1
2uH)=2 1
uH.T h i s
implies that nW is not a feasible solution.
To ﬁnd the optimal, feasible solution for n, we ﬁrst show that the value of n such that
t =1is smaller than nW and is consistent with   0.E q u a t i n gt =1in the ﬁrst expression
in the brackets in (17) and solving for n,w eo b t a i nn =2 U. Substituting this and t =1
into ,w eg e tt h a t  0 is satisﬁed for
U  2 
1
2uH
.( 1 9 )
N o wt os h o wt h a tn =2 U?n W,n o t et h a t2  1
2uH A 1  1








Using (19), it follows that
U
2uH  1
A 2  U /
U2





which can be rearranged as
U2




so that n =2 U?n W.
Using the fact that  is concave in n it follows that for the lowest value of n consistent
with t =1 ,g i v e nb yn =2U, the left hand derivative C
Cn





=0 , which implies that C
Cn
+ ? 0,s ot =1and n =2 U is the




 (2  U)uH=
Since EV =0we have  = VZ= Intermediation will only take place if  A 0 or equivalently
UA2  1@2uH= Parts B and C of the proposition follow. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3: As before, the equilibrium value of monitoring t is given by







O  4(1 n)
´
(UuO). As before, we need uO  2
s
1  n for
an equilibrium to exist.
We now turn to the determination of uO and n. We ﬁrst show that  A 0 is never optimal.
We divide this analysis into four cases as a function of the possible equilibrium values of t
and n.
Case 1: t?1 and n?1.G i v e n t h a t EV = t(U  uO) A 0,h a v i n g A 0 cannot be
optimal since borrowers would prefer to lower uO slightly and raise n in such a way as to not
reduce t. This increases EV while keeping   0.
Case 2: t?1 and n =1 .W i t hn =1 , we obtain that t = uO  1.S u b s t i t u t i n gi n t ot h e
expression for bank proﬁts yields  = uO




2  uH ? 0 since uO  1,t h u s
violating the bank’s participation constraint.
Case 3: t =1and n?1. Again, borrowers would prefer to lower uO slightly and increase
n. This increases EV and maintains   0.
Case 4: t = n =1 .T h e n = uO  uH  1
2  0 / uO  uH + 1
2 A 1.N o t et h a tf o rn =1
we have t =m i n {uO>1} =1 . We therefore want to lower uO until uO = uH + 1
2,w h i c hs t i l l
leaves t =1but reduces  to zero.
These four cases together imply that  must equal zero at the optimum. Consider
now a candidate solution with t =1 .F r o m  = uO  3
2 + n(1  uH)=0 ,w eo b t a i n
uO = 3
2 + n(uH  1). For this to be optimal for borrowers, n must be the lowest value
















Setting this equal to one and solving for n gives n = 1
2uH.W i t ht h i sv a l u ef o rn the expression
for uO gives uO =2 1
2uH. Note that, given our candidate solution has t =1 > no other
solution can increase EV while satisfying the bank’s participation constraint. For nA 1
2uH,
uO A 2  1
2uH,b u tt does not increase beyond 1, thus lowering EV.F o rn? 1
2uH, satisfying
the bank’s participation constraint with equality requires reducing uO.T h i s l o w e r s t to
below 1, violating the assumption that t =1at the optimum. Note further that for t =1 ,





, which is clearly greater than zero only for UA2  1
2uH.
It remains to be shown that at the optimum t =1must hold. To see this, recall the








O  4(1 n)
¶
>


















We can then substitute these expressions into the problem of maximizing borrower surplus
with the maximization now taken with respect to t so that maxt EV = t
³






tU t2  1+
t2
2uH. The derivative yields
CEV
Ct




with the second derivative given by C2EV
Ct2 = 2+ 1





= UA0,s ot h a tc l e a r l ytA0 is optimal. Setting (20) equal to zero and
solving for t,w eo b t a i ntW = U
23 1
uH
.F r o mt h i sw es e et h a tf o rUA2  1
2uH, tW A 1,s ot h a t
t h es o l u t i o nm u s th a v et =1 .M o r e o v e r ,f r o ma b o v ew ek n o wt h a tf o rt =1 , EV = VZ A 0
for UA2  1
2uH. This gives part A of the proposition.
Finally, consider the case where U?2  1
2uH,s ot h a tt?1. Substituting the optimal




























































  1 ? 0 for U?2  1
2uH. The only feasible optimal solution
for the maximization of borrower surplus is then t =1 , n = 1
2uH,a n duO =2 1
2uH for
UA2  1
2uH.F o r U?2  1
2uH, no intermediation is possible. This gives part B of the
proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 4: As before, the equilibrium value of monitoring t is given by (17)
and uO  2
s
1  n is needed for an equilibrium to exist when t?1. Assuming that uO is












This is positive for uO $ 2
s
1  n. We then set CEV
CuO =0and solve for the loan rate as the








For uO A b uO> it can be shown that CEV








O  4(1 n)
μ
U  b uO  % 
q
b u2
O  4(1 n)+%2 +2 %b uO
¶
=
Evaluating the term in brackets at % =0gives that it is zero and this in turn means CEV
CuO =0 =
We need to show that for %A0> CEV
CuO is negative. Since t and
p
u2
O  4(1 n) remain positive
what is important is the sign of the term in brackets. Dierentiating this with respect to
% gives a negative term and the result follows. It follows from all of this that EV(uO) is a
concave function in the relevant range.
Note also that for
uO A uO  2  n  2
s
1  n> (23)
it follows from (17) that t =1and for uO ? uO>t?1=
We now divide the analysis into two cases: (1) U  2;a n d( 2 )U?2.










for UA2. This implies that borrowers always demand a loan rate equal to uO = uO =2n
so that t =1as long as this satisﬁes the bank’s participation constraint,   0,w h i c hi t
does for n  1
2uH.F o rnA 1
2uH such that the bank’s participation constraint binds, we need
to set uO to satisfy (uO|n)=0 .
Assuming the bank’s participation constraint is satisﬁed, we can now turn to the problem
in the ﬁrst stage to determine n.S i n c et =1the problem simpliﬁes to
max
n
VZ = U 
3
2
+ n(1  uH)=
The ﬁrst order condition yields CVZ
Cn =1 uH ? 0,s ot h a tn =0is optimal. We check that
this solution does in fact satisfy the bank’s participation constraint, as  = tuO (1 n) 
nuH  1
2t2 =2 n  (1  n)  nuH  1
2 = 1
2 A 0. Therefore, n =0 , t =1 ,a n duO =2
is a candidate solution for U  2. T h a ti ti sa l s ot h eo p t i m a ls o l u t i o nc a nb es e e nf r o m
noting that higher values of n cannot increase t further, so that any solution with nA 1
2uH
and uO determined from (uO|n)=0when the bank’s participation constraint binds must
necessarily lead to lower VZ.
Case 2: U?2. We know that a minimum condition for an equilibrium to exist is that
37uO  2
s
1  n.S o l v i n g f o r n, this is equivalent to requiring n  1 
u2
O
4 .F o r uO = U,t h i s
implies nmin =1 U2
4 as an absolute lower bound on the level of capital that is consistent
with equilibrium.
Using (22) and (23) it can be seen that










Substituting nmin and rearranging gives





Taking these together it follows that b uO ? uO for U?2 and from this also that t(b uO) ? 1.
Deﬁne now uE
O as the loan rate that satisﬁes the bank’s participation constraint with
equality, that is (uE
O|n)=0 .A l s oC
CuO =( uO  t)
Ct
CuO + tA0= If, for a given n, b uO Au E
O,
then at the optimum borrowers choose uO = b uO,a n dt?1,  A 0. If, however, for a given n,
b uO ?u E





=0 . In this case, the
optimal loan rate is the lowest rate for which  =0 ,w h i c hi suE
O. This is because no lower
rate is feasible since (uO) ? 0 for any uO ?u E
O.A h i g h e r uO is feasible but not optimal
since it follows from the concavity of EV that EV must be decreasing for uO A b uO.







=0 > or uO = b uO with (b uO)  0.T h el e v e lo fn chosen by the regulator remains
to be determined for the two uO. S t a r tw i t ht h ec a s ew h e r euO = uE






Here, the maximization of VZ is equivalent to the maximization of EV,f o rw h i c hw ek n o w
from Proposition 3 that the solution involves t =1and uO =2 n. This implies  = 1
2nuH,
and since by assumption we have  =0 , this implies that n = 1
2uH at the optimum. Under
this solution social welfare equals














We note that VZ  0 for U  2  1
2uH.
Next, consider the candidate loan rate uO = b uO = U
2 +
2(13n)
U ,w i t ht?1. For this solution
to be feasible, it must satisfy   0, so that the bank’s participation constraint does not




















Taking the positive root, t = U
2, while taking the negative root, t =
2(13n)




U for n  1  U2
4 , so that the level of monitoring with the positive










Cn (U  t)+( 1 uH).F o r
Ct
Cn =0 , CVZ






U (U  t)+(1 uH) ? 0, so that either way the regulator prefers the lowest possible
38n.F r o ma b o v e ,t h i sl o w e s tv a l u ei sg i v e nb yn =1 U2
4 .
Now b uO = U when evaluated at n =1 U2
4 . For this level of n and uO, EV =0 . However,
t = U
2, which implies







We compare the two candidate solutions to ﬁnd which yields the higher social welfare.





















so that, for UAU DE, VZ is maximized by setting n =1 U2
4 ,w i t ht = U
2, uO = U,a n d
 = VZ A 0. T h i si sp a r tA . 2i nt h ep r o p o s i t i o n . F o rU?U DE, VZ is maximized by
setting n = 1
2uH,w i t ht =1 , uO =2n,  =0and VZ = U2+ 1
2uH.T h i si sp a r tBo ft h e
proposition.
Finally, if U2+ 1
2uH ? 0 no intermediation occurs and this is part C of the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 6: Now that there is deposit insurance uG =1and (2) simpliﬁes to
t =m i n{uO  (1  n)>1}= (24)










which equals 1 if t =1and equals t if t?1 since from (24),
Ct
CuO =1 . I nb o t hc a s e s
C
CuO A 0 so that uO = U= Substituting this into the expression for the expected proﬁts and










which is equal to 1  uH ? 0 if t =1and is equal to t  uH ? 0 if t?1 since
Ct
Cn =1 .
The solution must therefore have n =0 . Substituting n =0and uO = U implies t =
min{U  1>1}= Thus t =1for U  2 and this gives part A of the proposition. For U 5 [1>2]
t = U  1 and this gives part B of the proposition. ¤
Proof of Proposition 7: As before, the bank chooses uO = U to maximize its expected
proﬁt and
t =m i n{U  (1  n)>1}= (25)
39Consider ﬁrst the case where t =1 .T h e n
CVZ
Cn
=1 uH ? 0
so that n =0 = Substituting this in the expression for t,w eh a v ea g a i nt h a tt =1if U  2.
Part A of the proposition follows.






U +1 uH  t
Ct
Cn
=2  uH  n =0
so that n =2 uH A 0 if uH ? 2 and n =0if uH  2.
Substituting for n in the expression for t in (25), if 2 AU uH we have t =1and then
the bank chooses the minimum level of n which guarantees this. This is obtained from setting
(25) equal to one, and yields nuhj =2U as in part B of the proposition. Alternatively, we
have t = U +1 uH ? 1 for U?u H  2 as in part C, and t = U  1 ? 1 for uH A 2> as in
part D.
Finally, consider the boundary for VZ  0 in Figure 4. In Region A VZ A 0 always
as UA2.I nR e g i o nBs o l v i n gVZ =0for U we have UEH =2 1
2uH so that VZ  0 for
U  UEH. Doing the same in Region C we ﬁnd that VZ  0 for U  UFH = uH  2+ p
3+4 uH  2u2
H.B o t hUEH and UFH intersect the line U = uH at uH =1+ 1 I
2.I nR e g i o n
D VZ  0 for U  UGH =
s
3. Below these boundaries VZ ? 0. ¤
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :We proceed in four steps. We ﬁrst show that n?1>u O ?Uand
 =0 ; we then characterize the two parts A and B of the proposition (see Figure 5).
Step 1:W es t a r tb ys h o w i n gt h a tn =1is not possible. Suppose n =1 = If t =1 ,i tm u s t
then be, from (24), that uO  2  n =1 . EV = U  uO is maximized at the lowest value of
uO consistent with   0.F o rn = t =1 ,  = uO  uH  1
2 which is nonnegative if and only
if uO  uH + 1
2.N o w ,f o ra n yuO  uH + 1
2 and n = t =1 , EV  U  uH  1
2.S i n c et =1 ,
we can keep  constant by lowering both n and uO simultaneously. Speciﬁcally, reduce n by
some small amount {n, and reduce uO by an amount {uO = {n(1  uH). This maintains
 constant and t =1 , but strictly increases EV. Therefore, n =1 , t =1cannot be optimal.
Suppose now n =1but t = uO  (1  n)=uO ? 1. Substituting again in the expression






O  uH ? 0
for uO ? 1 and uH  1. This implies that also n =1 , t?1 cannot be optimal. Therefore,
any solution must have n?1.
Step 2: We now show that uO ?Umust hold. Suppose uO = U so that EV =0 .T h i s
cannot be optimal since it is always possible to do better than this by choosing uO and n
such that 1 ?u O ?Uso t =m i n{uO  (1  n)>1} A 0,   0,a n dEV = t(U  uO) A 0=
Step 3: We next show that  =0in equilibrium. Suppose to the contrary that  A 0=
Then, if t?1 and n?1 we have EV =( uO  (1  n))(U  uO) and CEV@Cn = U  uO A 0
40for all n. However, this gives a contradiction as it is inconsistent with n?1. Next consider
t =1and n?1= The former implies uO  2  n and maximizing EV =( U  uO) leads to
uO =2 n= N o wi ti sp o s s i b l et oi n c r e a s eEV by lowering uO further and increasing n until
n = 1
2uH= This satisﬁes  = uO(1n)nuH  1
2 =0and contradicts the initial assumption
of  A 0.
Step 4: We now turn to the expressions for n> uO and t knowing that n?1, uO ?Uand
 =0 . There are two possibilities for the monitoring eort, t =1and t?1,a n dt h e s e
correspond to parts D and E in the proposition.





(uO  (1  n))
2  nuH =0 =
After rearranging and taking square roots, we have
uO =1 n +
p
2uHn and t =
p
2uHn?1= (26)
The last inequality implies n?n = 1
2uH for t?1. Given (26), it follows that
EV(n)=
p














2uHn  2uH= (28)
Putting CEV









This gives two distinct roots for 2uH  3(U  1) A 0 or, equivalently, U?
2uH




n=0 A 0,t h er o o tf o rn with a minus, nLQW> is a local maximum while
the root with a plus, nPLQ, is a local minimum. To see then whether nLQW is a global
m a x i m u m ,w eﬁ r s tn o t et h a tn is the maximum possible optimal value of n since for nA 1
2uH,
t =1 >E V= U  uO with uO =3 @2+n(uH  1) satisfying the constraint  =0 ,a n d
CEV
Cn
= (uH  1) ? 0> (29)
so that nAn is never optimal for borrowers. Then, we compare nLQW and nPLQ with
n = 1
2uH. To do this, we distinguish between two cases given by uH A 3
2 and uH  3
2.
(i) Consider uH A 3
2. Setting nLQW = n and solving for U yields




Since nLQW is increasing in U,t h i si m p l i e st h a tnLQW ? n for U?3  3
2uH. Now notice that
41for uH A 3




























?n PLQ implies n?n PLQ.T h u s , i f uH A 3
2,w e






U  3+ 3
2uH
´
? 0, implies that EV(nLQW) AE V (n) and therefore that nLQW
is the global maximum for U?U DE and uH A 3
2.B y c o n t r a s t , f o r UDE ?U?
2uH
3 +1 ,
nLQW A n and n = 1
2uH is the global optimum since t =1 , CEV
Cn
¯ ¯
n=n A 0 and as in (29)
CEV@Cn ? 0 for nA 1
2uH= Finally, for UA
2uH
3 +1 ,n or e a lv a l u ef o rnLQW exists. It follows
that for 0  n? 1
2uH, CEV@Cn A 0. Similarly to (29), CEV@Cn ? 0 for nA 1
2uH.T h u s
n = 1
2uH is the global maximum and t =1 =
(ii) Consider now uH ? 3























so that nLQW ? n.N o w nPLQ = n for U =3 3
2uH,a n dnPLQ A n for U?3  3
2uH since
nPLQ is decreasing in U. T h i si m p l i e st h a tnLQW is the global optimum for U  3  3
2uH
using a similar argument to the one above for uH A 3
2. On the other hand, for UA3  3
2uH,
nPLQ ? n and therefore EV(nLQW) could be higher or lower than EV(n). To see when
EV(nLQW) AE V (n), set them equal to each other and solve for U. Denoting this value by




2 . Then the global optimum is at n = nLQW for
U?U DE and at n = n = 1
2uH for U  UDE.
Together (i) and (ii) give the boundary for parts A and B of the proposition and the
values of nEV, uO,a n dt= In part A EV = VZ = t(U  uO)=U  (2  1
2uH) a n di np a r tB
EV = t(U  1+nEV  t) and VZ = EV  (1  t)(1  nEV)=tU t2  (1  nEV).
Finally, consider the boundary where VZ =0illustrated in Figure 5. In Region A VZ =
U(2 1
2uH). Evaluating this at the boundary for Region A for uH ? 3







8uH A 0. This implies that social welfare is positive at the boundary as
w e l la sa b o v ei t .T h es a m eh o l d sf o ruH  3
2, since evaluating social welfare at UDE =3 3
2uH,
we obtain VZ|UDE =1 1
uH A 0.
Consider now social welfare in Region B as given by VZ = tUt2(1nEV). Evaluating




2 for uH ? 3




16uH .T h i se q u a l sz e r o
at uH =1 =226,i sn e g a t i v ef o ruH ? 1=226 and positive for 1=226  uH ? 1=5.C o n s i d e rn o w
the case uH  3
2.I tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a tf o ruH  1=226 there exists a boundary b U as deﬁned
implicitly by VZ = tU  t2  (1  nEV)=0such that VZ  0 for U  b U and VZ ? 0
otherwise. ¤
Proof of Proposition 10: We proceed in two steps. We ﬁrst describe how the optimal
amount of capital n is determined depending on which constraints bind. Then we ﬁnd the
42global optimum nUHJ as a function of the parameters U and uH.
Step 1. We start by determining the optimal amount of capital n depending on the
constraints   0 and t  1 in the maximization problem.
Case 1: Unconstrained case ( A 0)f o rt?1.I ft = uO  (1  n) ? 1, then from the
ﬁrst order condition CEV@CuO =0we have
uO =





U  (1  n)
2
? 1= (31)
Substituting these expressions for t and uO into (14) gives:
VZX(n)=U
μ
U  (1  n)
2
¶
























so VZX is a concave function. Given this, there are three possibilities for the optimal value
of n when  A 0:
(i)
CVZX
Cn ? 0, in which case n =0is optimal.
(ii)
CVZX
Cn =0 , in which case there is an interior optimum given by
n
LQW












Cn A 0, in which case the optimum equates the value of n at which either the
constraint   0 or the constraint t  1 s t a r tt ob eb i n d i n g .T oﬁ n dw h e r e =0binds, we





U  (1  n)
2
¶2
 nuH.( 3 6 )
Setting X =0and solving for n gives the value n0 where the constraint starts to bind










The constraint t  1 starts instead to bind at n = nX,w h e r enX equates (31) to 1 and is
43equal to
¯ nX =3 U= (38)
Thus, the optimal value of n when
CVZX
Cn A 0 is at n = n0 if n0 ? ¯ nX and at n = ¯ nX if instead
n0 A ¯ nX.
Case 2: Constrained case ( =0 )f o rt?1.W h e n  =0 ,a si n( 2 6 )w eh a v euO =
1  n +
s
2uHn,a n dt =
s
2uHn. Substituting these into (14) gives
VZF =
p
























n=0 A 0. This implies that there
are two possibilities for the optimal value of n when  =0and t?1:





2(2uH  1)2= (40)
(ii) CVZF@Cn A 0,s ot h a tt h eo p t i m u mn is where the constraint t  1 starts to be




? 1 since uH  1> (41)
and the optimal value of n is at n = ¯ nF if ¯ nF ?n LQW
F . Substituting ¯ nF in (39) gives




Case 3: Unconstrained case ( A 0)f o rt =1 .F r o m t =1 , it follows uO =2 n.
Substituting t =1into (14), we then have






=1 uH ? 0 (43)
as uH A 1. Thus, the only possible optimal value for n when  A 0 and t =1is at the value
where the constraint t =1starts to be binding, obtained from the ﬁrst order condition in
(30), which gives n = nX =3 U=
44Case 4: Constrained case ( =0 )f o rt =1 . Substituting t =1in (14) we obtain
VZF1 = VZX1 = U  (1  n)  nuH  1
2 and thus
CVZF1
Cn =1 uH ? 0. Then the only
possible optimum in this case is the lowest value of n such that  =0and t =1as given by
nF = 1
2uH.









This implies that there is always an unconstrained region with t?1 for su!ciently small
values of n when U?3= At n0 the proﬁt constraint begins to bind. At this point both
the unconstrained and the constrained solutions are the same. For higher values of n there
is a constrained region. In determining the global optimum the potential values of n are
0>nX>n 0>nLQW
X >¯ nF or nLQW
F = In fact it is possible to show that in all the regions where VZ 
0>¯ nF ?n LQW
F = This will be done after considering all the regions and the other constraints.
Step 2. Now that we have derived the possible cases depending on the constraints   0
and t  1 and the optimal values of n in each of them, we analyze how the two constraints
move as a function of the parameters uH and U, and determine the global optimal value for
n in each scenario. The regions refer to those in Figure 6.
Region A: When U  3 the optimal solution for n is n =0in the unconstrained case
with t =1 .F o rU  3,t h ec o n s t r a i n tt =1binds already at n =0from (31), and given (43),
that is also the global optimum. From the expressions in Step 1 for the unconstrained region
i tc a nb es e e nt h a tw i t hn =0 > and t =1 >u O = U+1
2 >EV= 1
2(U1) A 0> = U
2 1 A 0 and
VZ = U  3
2 A 0=
Region B: In this region the global optimum is at n = ¯ nX =3 U in the unconstrained
case ( A 0) with t =1 . This requires:
¯ nX  n0>C V Z X@Cn|n=0 A 0>n
LQW
X  ¯ nX> ¯ nX  0=
The ﬁrst condition assures that the constraint t =1hits before the  =0constraint and
we can only consider the unconstrained region. Using (38) and (37) it can be seen that the






The next two conditions ensure that ¯ nX is optimal in the unconstrained region and thus also
globally optimal; it can be seen from (33), (34) and (38) that they are both satisﬁed for
U  UEF,w h e r eUEF gives the boundary between regions B and C and is deﬁned by
UEF =2 uH  1= (45)
The last condition just requires ¯ nX to be non-negative and is satisﬁed for U  3. This implies
that the boundary with region A is at U =3as shown above=
45Finally, using n = ¯ nX =3 U and t =1in the expressions for the unconstrained case
we obtain uO = U  1, EV =1 ,  = 1
2  (3  U)uH A 0,a n dVZ = 1
2  (3  U)uH A 0=
Region C: In this region the global optimum value is at nLQW
X in the unconstrained case
for t?1. For this it is needed that
n
LQW
X  ¯ nX>n
LQW
X  n0>C V Z X@Cn|n=0  0> ¯ nF ?n
LQW
F >V Z X(n
LQW
X )  VZF(¯ nF)=
The ﬁrst three inequalities guarantee that nLQW
X is optimal in the unconstrained case, while
the last two ensure that nLQW
X is also the global optimum.
The ﬁrst inequality is satisﬁed for U  UEF,w h e r eUEF is given by (45). The second
inequality will be shown to be satisﬁed below. The third inequality implies from (33) that
CVZX
Cn








+1 uH  0> (46)
or equivalently
U  UFG =4 uH  5= (47)
where UFG deﬁnes the boundary between regions C and D.
The fourth inequality is shown to be satisﬁed at the end of the proof of this proposition.
The ﬁfth inequality is satisﬁed for U  UFH,w i t hUFH found by equating the expressions
for VZX(nLQW
X ) and VZF(¯ nF) as found in (35) and (42) to give
UFH = uH +
p
uH  8u2





It can be seen that the intersection of boundaries UEF and UFG is at uH =2and U =3 =
It can also be checked that UEH>U EF and UFH intersect at uH =1 =866 and U =2 =732= Also
UFG and UFH intersect at uH =1 =933 and U =2 =732=
With regard to the constraint nLQW
X  n0> it can be seen using (34) and (37) that this is





H. It can be checked that Region C lies below this
constraint.
To conclude, the optimal value of n is nLQW
X = U+14(uH1), and using the expressions
for the unconstrained region uO =2 ( uH1), t = U2(uH1) ? 1, EV =( 22uH+U)2 A 0,
 = 1
2(U +2 ) 2  3(U +3 ) uH +6 u2
H A 0 and VZ = U2
2 + U  (U +5 ) uH +2 u2
H +2A 0=
Region D: In this region the global optimum is at the value n =0in the unconstrained
case ( A 0) with t?1.S u !cient conditions for this to hold are:
CVZX
Cn
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
n=0
? 0> ¯ nF ?n
LQW
F >V Z X(0)  VZF(¯ nF)=
The ﬁrst condition assures that n =0is the optimal value in the unconstrained region, while
the second and third assure that n =0is the global optimum. The ﬁrst condition is satisﬁed
when U?U FG where UFG is given in (47).
The second inequality is demonstrated at the end of the proof of the proposition. For
the third inequality, equating VZX(0) from (32) with VZF(¯ nF) from (42) and solving for











The third inequality is therefore satisﬁed for U  UGH and UGH gives the boundary between
Regions D and E. Taking the limit as uH $4it can be seen that UGH $ 7@3 A 2= Also it
can be checked that UGH intersects with UFG and UGH at uH =1 =933 and U =2 =732=
For region D to exist, it must also be that the t =1constraint does not bind when
 A 0 at n =0 . This guarantees that the unconstrained case with t?1 is the relevant
one at n =0 . Substituting the expression for uO as given by (30) in the expression for
t = uO (1n) at the value n =0yields t = U31
2 .T h u s ,t h et =1boundary starts to bind
at n =0for U =3 . This gives the boundary between regions A and D as shown in Figure 6.
With n =0and t = U31
2 ? 1> it can be shown in the usual way that uO = U
2>EV =
1
4U(U  1) A 0> = 1
8(U2  4U +3 )A 0 and VZ = 1
8(3U2  2U  9) A 0=
Region E: In Region E the global optimum is at the value n = ¯ nF = 1
2uH in the constrained
case ( =0 )and t =1 .S u !cient conditions for this to hold are
n0  ¯ nX> ¯ nF  n
LQW
F >V Z F(¯ nF)  VZX(n
LQW
X )>V Z F(¯ nF)  VZX(0)>V Z F(¯ nF)  VZX(n0)=
The ﬁrst inequality assures that in addition to n =0the two relevant cases to consider in
the unconstrained region are  A 0 with t?1,w h i c hi snLQW
X > and  =0with t?1> which
is n0. The second condition guarantees that ¯ nF is optimal in the constrained case. The
remaining three inequalities ensure that ¯ nF is the global optimum by requiring that social
welfare in ¯ nF be at least as good as in any potential optima in the unconstrained case.
The upper boundary of Region E has been considered in the discussion of Regions B, C
and D above. UEH follows from the ﬁrst inequality, UFH from the third, and UGH from the
fourth.
The ﬁnal inequality follows from the fact that at n0>t?1 from the ﬁrst inequality. Given
that the unconstrained and constrained solutions coincide at this point and t =
s
2uHn is
increasing in n a tt h i sp o i n ti tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tn0 ? ¯ nF= Combining this with the
concavity of VZF and ¯ nF  nLQW
F > the inequality follows. As before, we leave ¯ nF  nLQW
F
until the end.
Consider next the EV  0 participation constraint of the borrowers. Given that in region
E nuhj = 1
2uH> we have uO =1 n +
s
2uHn =2 1
2uH= Thus the participation constraint
becomes EV = U  2  1





Finally, given n = 1
2uH>t =1 > and uO =2 1
2uH> it can be shown in the usual way that
EV = VZ = U  (2  1
2uH) A 0> and  =0 =
Region F: It can be seen that for the optimal solution in Region E where n = ¯ nF = 1
2uH
in the constrained region, VZ = U  (2  1
2uH) ? 0 for U?U HI= However, this is not the
47o n l yo p t i m a ls o l u t i o ni nR e g i o nF .S of a ri th a sb e e na s s u m e dt h r o u g h o u tt h a t¯ nF  nLQW
F =
If this inequality is reversed then nLQW
F is optimal. Using (41) and (40) it can be shown that





For UA2  1
uH we have ¯ nF  nLQW
F .S i n c e2  1
uH ? 2  1
2uH it follows that ¯ nF  nLQW
F holds
in Regions C, D, and E as required above.
For U  2  1
uH, nLQW
F is the optimal solution. However, it can be shown using the
expressions for the constrained solution in step 1 that VZ ? 0 for all these values of U and
uH.T h u sVZ ? 0 in the whole of Region F and there is no intermediation. ¤
Proof of Proposition 11: To prove this, we overlap Figures 5 and 6 and we compare nEV
and nuhj in each region to give Figure 7. We note ﬁrst that the boundary between Regions A
and B in Figure 5 lies above the one between Regions E and F in Figure 6 and intersects the
boundary between regions D and E in Figure 6 at uH =3 =52= We consider now each region
of Figure 7 in turn. For clarity, in what follows we deﬁne the regions of Proposition 9 as
9.A and 9.B, and those of Proposition 10 as 10.A, 10.B, 10.C, 10.D, 10.E and 10.F. Regions
without a preﬁx refer to Figure 7.
Region A: nEV An uhj= This region consists of Regions 10.A, 10.B, 10.C and 10.D. We
consider each of them in turn.
Region 10.D=
It can be seen directly that nEV = 1
2uH An uhj =0 =
Region 10.E=
In this region for nEV An uhj to hold, it is necessary that nEV = 1
2uH An uhj =3 U> or
equivalently UA3 1
2uH=It can be seen directly that Region E satisﬁes this constraint since
the lower boundary is UEH =3 1@2uH.
Region 10.F=
In this region for nEV An uhj to hold, it is necessary that nEV = 1
2uH An uhj = U +
1  4(uH  1)>or equivalently U  4uH  5+ 1
2uH=It can be seen that the boundary of this
intersects with U =2 uH  1 at the corner of Region 10.C where UEF =2 uH  1 intersects
with UEH =31@2uH= It can straightforwardly be checked that apart from this point Region
10.C lies below U =4 uH  5+ 1
2uH so that nEV An uhj=
Region 10.G.
As already described, the boundary between Regions 9.A and 9.B intersects with the
boundary of Region 10.D so that we have to compare nEV as deﬁned both in Regions 9.A
and 9.B with nuhj in Region 10.D. It is easy to see that nEV An uhj always since nuhj =0in
Region 10.D and nEV A 0 in both Regions 9.A and 9.B.
Region B: nEV = nuhj= This region consists of the overlap between Region 9.A and
Region 10.E. It can be seen directly from Propositions 9 and 10 that nEV = nuhj = 1
2uH=
Region C: nEV ?n uhj= This region derives from overlapping Regions 9.B and 10.E. It







,a n dnuhj = 1
2uH.T h e
48boundary nEV = nuhj is equivalent to U =3 3
2uH. This is the boundary for Regions 9.A
and 9.B for uH  3







2uH  3(U  1)
3
!
(2uH  3(U  1))
31
2UA0>
and that nuhj =1 @2uH is independent of U, it follows that as U falls so does nEV@nUHJ.
Thus, nEV ?n uhj for U?3  3
2uH and uH  3
2.
Consider now uH ? 3
2. We know from the proof of Proposition 9 that in this case













This, together with the fact that CnEV
CU A 0, implies that nEV ?n uhj is satisﬁed on the
boundary between Regions 9.A and 9.B as well as below it. Thus, nEV ?n uhj=
Region D: nEV A 0 and there is no intermediation in the regulatory case. Here the
relevant areas are Regions 9.B and 10.F.
The proposition follows. ¤
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52The market        _____________________________________________________________ 
                       The bank chooses           The firm decides  The bank chooses        The project 
                         ,   and  D L kr r                     whether to accept        its monitoring              matures; 
          the loan    effort q             claims are  
                      settled 
The regulator  __________________ 
                        The regulator      The bank chooses  
                         chooses k            and  D L rr
Figure 1: Timing of the model Figure 2: Comparison of market and regulatory solutions with monopoly and no deposit insurance. The
figure compares the level of capital in the market solution (k
M) and in the regulatory solution (k
reg) in the case of 
monopoly and no deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure 
distinguishes three regions: Region A, as defined by 2 R t , where 0
Mr e g kk    ; Region B, as defined by 
21 2 2 E rR d  , where  2
Mr e g kk R     ; and Region C, as defined by  21 2 E Rr  , where there is no 

















Mr e g Bk k R    Figure 3: Comparison of market and regulatory solutions with competition and no deposit insurance. The
figure compares the level of capital in the market solution (k
BS) and in the regulatory solution (k
reg) in the case of 
competition and no deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure 
distinguishes four regions: Region A.1, as defined by 2 R t , where 12 0
BS reg
E kr k  !   ; Region A.2, as defined 
by 2 AB RR dwith
234 2 ( 42 264 ) (2 ) AB E E E E E E E R r rrrrrr      , where
2 12 1 4
BS reg
E kr kR  !   ; Region 
B, as defined by21 2 E AB rR R d  , where 12
BS reg
E kk r    ; and Region C, as defined by 21 2 E Rr  , where 





































AB RR  
1
1Figure 4: Comparison of market and regulatory solutions with monopoly and deposit insurance. The
figure compares the level of capital in the market solution (k
M) and in the regulatory solution (k
reg) in the case of 
monopoly and deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure 
distinguishes five regions: Region A, as defined by 2 R t , where 0
Mr e g kk    ; Region B, as defined 
by 21 2 2 EB E E rR rR      , where 02
Mr e g kkR    ; Region C, as defined 
by
2 23 42 2 CE E E E E Rr rr R r      d, where 02
Mr e g
E kkr    ; and Region D, as defined by 
32 DE RR    and 2 E r t , where  0
Mr e g kk    . The boundaries RBE and RCE intersect the line R=rE at 
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E Ck k r    
1
Boundary for SW 0  t
with regulation
E. No intermediation with regulation 
1.707
. 0 2
Mr e g Bk k R    Figure 5: Market solution with competition and deposit insurance. The figure shows the level of capital in 
the market solution (k
BS) for the case of competition and deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE
and of the project return R. The figure distinguishes two regions: Region A, as defined by AB RR t ,
where 12
BS
E kr   ; and Region B, as defined by AB RR  , where 
2
22 3 ( 1 ) 3
BS
EE kr r R    . The boundary 
between the two regions is given by 32 38 2 AB E E Rr r    for 32 E r  and by  33 2 AB E Rr   for 32 E r t . The 
figure also shows the boundary for SW 0 t . This coincides with RAB for 1.266 E r  and equals  l R for 1.266 E r t ,
where l R solves
2 (1 ) 0
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Boundary for SW 0 tFigure 6: Regulatory solution with competition and deposit insurance. The figure shows the level of capital 
in the regulatory solution (k
reg) for the case of competition and deposit insurance as a function of the cost of 
equity rE and of the project return R. The figure distinguishes six regions: Region A, as defined by 3 R t ,
where 0
reg k   ; Region B, as defined by 3 BC RR d and 3 BE RR d , where 3
reg kR   ; Region C, as defined 
by 3 BC RR  , 3 CE RR d and  3 CD RR d , where  14 ( 1 )
reg
E kR r    ; Region D, as defined by 3 CD RR 
and 3 DE RR d , where  0
reg k   ; Region E, as defined by EF RR d , BE RR  , CE RR  and DE RR  , where 
12
reg
E kr   ; Region F, as defined by  EF RR   , where there is no intermediation. The boundaries between the 
regions are as follow: 21 BC E Rr   , 31 2 BEE Rr   ,
23 4 81 03 CE E E E E E E Rrrr rr r      , 45 CD E Rr   ,
 52 3 3 DEE E E Rr r r    , 21 2 EFE Rr   . The proof of Proposition 10 contains the intersection points 
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2Figure 7: Comparison of market and regulatory solution with competition and deposit insurance. The 
figure compares the levels of capital in the market solution (k
BS) and regulatory solution (k
reg) for the case of 
competition and deposit insurance as a function of the cost of equity rE and of the project return R. The figure 
distinguishes four regions: Region A, where
BSr e g kk ! ; Region B, where
BSr e g kk   ; Region C, where
BSr e g kk  ;
and Region D, where  0
reg k ! and there is no intermediation with regulation. Region A exists 
for 31 2 BEE RR r t   ,
23 4 81 03 CE E E E E E E RR r r r r rr t     , and    52 3 3 DEE E E RR r r r t   ; Region 
B exists between  BE RR  , CE RR  , DE RR  , and ˆ RR t where ˆ 32 38 2 EE Rr r    for 32 E r  and 
ˆ 33 2 E Rr   for 32 E r t . Region C exists for ˆ 21 2 E rR R d  ; and Region D exists for 21 2 E Rr t . The 
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Upper boundary of 
Region B from Prop. 9Figure 8: Comparison of the market solution in the case of monopoly with and without deposit insurance.
The figure compares the market solutions in the case of monopoly with and without deposit insurance. The 
figure highlights two regions: Regions A, defined by  2( 1) E Rr  , 21 2 E Rr t , and 2 R  , where social 
welfare is higher with deposit insurance than without; and Region B, defined by  32 1 2 E Rr d  , where 
intermediation is feasible with deposit insurance but not without. The intersections between the boundaries are 
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